Brazil & the Global South

Historical context

Brazil's relations with Africa rest on the history of the Atlantic, on a shared language with five African states in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, and on decades of diplomatic engagement. In February 2024 Poder360 reported 35 Brazilian embassies, consulates and representations on the continent; decrees of late 2023 created new embassies in Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Kigali (Rwanda) and a Consulate-General in Luanda.

Brazilian foreign policy

According to Brazil's official trade data, trade with Africa totalled about US$23.7bn in 2025, with a Brazilian surplus of US$7.2bn. Agência Brasil reported in May 2026 that President Lula had made seven trips to Africa in his current term.

Mauro Vieira's documented role

As Permanent Representative to the UN, Vieira chaired the Peacebuilding Commission's configuration on Guinea-Bissau (2016–2020). As minister, he attended the G20 foreign ministers' meetings in Johannesburg in February 2025 and the Cairo conference on humanitarian aid to Gaza in December 2024.

Historical context

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency, attached to the Foreign Ministry, began as the body that managed technical cooperation Brazil received from developed countries. Over time it became primarily a provider of South-South technical cooperation — sharing Brazilian public-policy experience in areas such as agriculture, health and education. The agency itself reports more than 7,000 projects in 108 countries.

Brazil's cooperation model is typically demand-driven and non-conditional — characteristics its practitioners contrast with traditional donor aid. That characterisation is Brazil's own; independent evaluations of South-South cooperation vary.

Historical context

IBSA joined India, Brazil and South Africa in a trilateral dialogue, with an IBSA Fund created in 2004. BRICS began as a meeting of foreign ministers at the UN in 2006 and held its first leaders' summit in 2009. Its 2024 enlargement brought in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, followed by Indonesia in 2025.

Mauro Vieira's documented role

I am sure that this expansion of the group will bring more weight and more visibility to BRICS on the world stage.

In April 2025 he chaired the first BRICS foreign ministers' meeting of the enlarged group in Rio de Janeiro, where he said the group, "with eleven member states representing almost half of humanity", was "in a unique position to promote peace and stability based on dialog, development, and multilateral cooperation".

• Brazil
• Russia
• India
• China
• South Africa
• Egypt
• Ethiopia
• Iran
• United Arab Emirates
• Indonesia

Saudi Arabia was invited to join in 2023; its membership has not been formally confirmed.

Mauro Vieira's documented role

With India — a strategic partner since 2006 and fellow member of IBSA and BRICS — Vieira co-chaired the Joint Commission with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in New Delhi in August 2024. In September 2026 he made an official visit to Singapore, where Brazil is seeking a fuller partnership with ASEAN, before travelling to New Delhi for the BRICS summit.

In the Middle East, his March 2024 visit to Ramallah included a meeting with President Mahmoud Abbas and an address at the Yasser Arafat Foundation, where he said Brazil would work to include Palestine as a full member of the United Nations.

Brazilian foreign policy

The demand that international institutions reflect today's distribution of power is a unifying theme of Brazil's Global South diplomacy. Under Brazil's G20 presidency the foreign ministers, meeting at UN Headquarters, launched a Call to Action on Global Governance Reform. In the same week Vieira addressed a ministerial meeting of the Global Governance Group (3G), and co-chaired the launch of the "Friends for Peace" group on Ukraine, attended by seventeen Global South countries.

Independent analysis

Critics and supporters alike note the tension between Brazil's reform agenda and its participation in a BRICS grouping whose members hold very different views of the international order. This observation is offered as context, not attributed to any official.